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Th rough the presented cases in which the Commission for Investigation of 
War Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators ascertained account-
ability, this work constitutes an attempt to depict all levels of collaboration 
and perpetration of war crimes (their forms in particular), both through 
individual and group decisions. Th e range was genuinely quite broad, cov-
ering the integrated apparatus of occupation, destruction of the people’s 
liberation movement, the struggle against Partisan units, crimes against ci-
vilians, plundering of assets and violence of all types.
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Based on the Instructions of the Land Commission for the Investigation of 
War Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators issued on 25 August 1944 
(no. 9/44), pursuant to the decision of the Antifascist Council of National Lib-
eration of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), of 30 November 1943 on the establishment of 
the State Commission for Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and 
Th eir Collaborators and based on Article 9 of the Operating Rules of the State 
Commission adopted at a session of the National Committee of the Liberation of 
Yugoslavia (NKOJ) on 6 May 1944, the principal tasks of the Commission for the 
Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators were: 
gathering of evidence on criminal acts perpetrated by the occupiers and their 
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collaborators in the territory of the city of Zagreb, as stipulated in Articles 3, 4, 5, 
6, 10, 11 and 13 of the Act on Crimes Against the People and State and Investiga-
tion of Crimes, for which the gathered materials were forwarded to the Croatian 
Land Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and 
Th eir Collaborators. In this sense, the Commission for Investigation of War 
Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators, as an investigative body, was 
obliged to conduct all necessary hearings and, if necessary, on-site inspections.1 
Studies on mass crimes had to be compiled, and crimes had to be classifi ed based 
on individual categories (Serbs, Jews, reprisals, summary military tribunals 
courts, courts martial, etc.). A fi nal task was the issuing of certifi cates pursuant 
to Article 53 of the State Registries Act.
In its work, the Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the 
Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators depended on the assistance of citizens, 
who, according to one proclamation, were expected to cooperate with it: “It is 
the duty of each citizen to report to the Commission for the Investigation of 
War Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators in Crime and Criminals”.2 
More rapid and higher quality data gathering had to be organized, as stated 
frequently, “from house to house” with the aid of literate youths or members of 
the Antifascist Women’s Front (AFŽ).3 Criticism was also levelled at the peo-
ple’s authorities, who “are accessing the archives left  behind by the enemies and 
their collaborators with insuffi  cient understanding”. Th e archives of enemy or-
ganizations and institutions were destroyed without inspection, even though 
according to some claims they contained data vital to the Commission’s work.4 
“Since our army was not cautioned earlier, it destroyed or discarded all of the 
printed and written materials found in buildings (from that little that the ene-
my left  behind), so that we were only able to fi nd very meagre data”. Th erefore, 
the Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and 
Th eir Collaborators turned to the local Command with the request that it or-
der all units accommodated in such buildings, “to place all written or printed 
materials that they found under watch, and to notify the local Command 
thereof ”.5
1  Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske. Zbornik dokumenata 1944./III 
(as of 10 May to 31 December) (Zagreb, 1975), p. 266.
2  Croatian State Archives (hereinaft er: HDA), Zagreb, fund 306 – Territorial Commission for 
the Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators (Zemaljska komisija 
za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača; hereinaft er: ZKRZ) Main Registration 
Record (Glavni urudžbeni zapisnik; hereinaft er: GUZ), box 1, Parole.
3  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Enemy assets (Neprijateljska imovina; hereinaft er: NI), box 659, no. 
2364, 11 July 1945.
4  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Central City Commission (Centralna gradska komisija; (hereinaft er: 
CGK), box 719, no. 1984/45, 15 June 1945.
5  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 711, no. 18/45, 30 May 1945. Th e Zagreb City Command 
sent a letter to the Central Commission, in which it stated that this letter was forwarded to all of 
its subordinate units. See: HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 711., no. 59/45, 4 June 1945.
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Some of these tasks were certainly also performed by the People’s Protection 
Department (OZN) as one of the vital components of the investigative apparatus 
in wartime and post-war Yugoslavia. Th us, for example, during September and 
October 1944, the OZN IV for the Zagreb District entered 447 persons in the 
card fi le who were numbered from 1,296 to 1,743, while the records of the inves-
tigative materials had 59 numbers.6 Already in February 1945, the list for Zagreb 
and its environs grew to 3,341, while the investigative materials numbered 104 
cases.7 Over the next month the District’s card fi les had 4,800 new criminals 
registered, and its completion soon aft er was announced.8
Also interesting were the so-called “Black Books” which contained lists of 
persons who had to be liquidated, while the assets were to be seized. Th eir 
importance was already noted in May 1944, when the District Committee of 
the Croatian Communist Party (KPH) for Makarska noted that “all war crimi-
nals would receive their deserved penalty for the crimes they committed 
against our people. ‘Black Books’ must be made […]. Th e precise day on which 
the crime was committed, who perpetrated it and where must be indicated. 
Th e descriptions of the occupiers’ crimes must indicate the military unit to 
which the criminal belonged, so that he may be sought aft er the end of the war, 
so that no criminal will remained unpunished”.9 Two months later, the Mu-
nicipal Committee of Gradac (Makarska) submitted a list of 99 persons, but 
also sought instructions pertaining to the further compilation of the “Black 
Book”, i.e., whether to specify in it “all clerks serving in the NDH apparatus up 
to the present day, and whether to also include those who served but are now 
in the NOV [People’s Liberation Army]”.10
According to the aforementioned, it is apparent that the investigative bod-
ies of the new authorities took the task entrusted to them quite seriously. It is 
likely that the Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Occupi-
ers and Th eir Collaborators already had some of these data at its disposal at the 
very beginning of its work. How valuable these data were, given the tasks which 
the State Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and 
Th eir Collaborators forwarded to the territorial commissions and their subor-
dinate units is diffi  cult to say. What certainly is a fact is that these were all-en-
compassing matters that required a great deal of time, particularly if one takes 
into account the new assignments placed before the Commission for the In-
vestigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators and the chrono-
logical circumstances that accompanied them.
6  Vladimir Geiger et al., ed., Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944.-
1946. Dokumenti. Zagreb i središnja Hrvatska (Zagreb – Slavonski Brod, 2008), p. 123.
7  Ibid., p. 205.
8  Ibid., p. 241.-242.
9  Mate Rupić et al., ed., Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944.-1946. 
Dokumenti. Dalmacija (Zagreb-Slavonski Brod, 2011), p. 95, 117-118.
10  Ibid., p. 119-120.
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According a circular released on 23 July 1945, the State Commission for 
the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators, given 
the possibility that the Peace Conference in Paris would soon be convened 
(upon which the entire work of the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes 
of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators was also contingent), sent a request 
for the urgent gathering of statistics on crimes committed in Yugoslavia. 
 According to instructions, the number of victims had to be classifi ed by loca-
tion, while the types of crimes according to diff erent categories, and the perpe-
trators of crimes according to nationality.11 Th us, the gathering of data in the 
fi eld was urgently initiated, while the delegates “must take the lead in work 
[…] each delegate must constantly be in the fi eld, touring villages […] collect-
ing reports […] It is the duty of delegates to […] inspect all fascist archives”.12 
However, it would appear that these activists did not take the task entrusted to 
them seriously enough and help the commission’s work. Despite the public 
proclamation that perpetrated crimes had to be punished, too many criminals 
were still free, particularly in the villages, where “not one activist has yet sub-
mitted a report to the commission”. Th ey had to be given to their “deserved 
penalty” and this was primarily a task of the activists, “for when we clean these 
pro-fascist elements from the people, then we will no longer have anyone to 
agitating among them and the people will support our authority because they 
will be convinced that our authorities are taking care of them”.13
Th e State Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers 
and Th eir Collaborators set a one-month deadline for the gathering of statis-
tics, while in the forwarded letter to the district and city commissions a period 
of 20 days was specifi ed.14 Aft er roughly a month, aft er which another rush 
order was released in the meantime, the work had not moved past its initial 
phase, and the gathered data were still incomplete. “Th e data on the number of 
slain victims are particularly defi cient, for in reality they far surpass the num-
ber specifi ed in the reports from the District Commissions”.15 In order to elim-
inate these operational shortcomings, on 12 September 1945 a conference of 
all heads of district commissions for the investigation of crimes of the occupi-
ers and their collaborators was convened, at which they had to present the 
summary reports on completed work. Th e same shortcomings were ascer-
tained in the areas covered by other territorial commissions the investigation 
of crimes of the occupiers and their collaborators, so at a conference of all ter-
ritorial commissions (24-26 May 1946) held in Belgrade, it was decided that 
11  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ NI, box 659, no. 1751/45, 8 July 1945.
12  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ District Commission (Okružna komisija; hereinaft er: OK), box 701, 
no. 669/45., 24 September 1945.
13  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ OK, box 700, 59/1945., 14 July 1945.
14  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 711, no. 2624/45., 23 July 1945.
15  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ NI, box 659, no number, 1 July 1946.
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already gathered data were to be re-collected and re-examined.16 It was decided 
that one person would be selected in each District Commission for the Inves-
tigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborator who would tour all 
district, city and municipal commissions for the investigation of crimes of the 
occupiers and their collaborators and instruct them on further work.17 
 Responding to the same circular, a letter to the City People’s Liberation Com-
mittee was also forwarded by the head of the Central City Commission for the 
Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators, Dragan 
Kastl. According to him, the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of 
the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators, through its street-level committees, 
had already gathered the relevant statistical data, but “as a result of insuffi  cient 
or defi cient organization in operations, this assignment was done in slipshod 
fashion. […] Data on the number of slain victims are particularly defi cient, for 
in reality they far surpass the number cited in the reports sent over to us at one 
point by the street-level committees.” Since the State Commission for the In-
vestigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators ordered a re-
newed audit of the data, Milan Polak, a member of the Commission for the 
Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators sought the 
assistance and support of the City People’s Committee, more precisely its sec-
retary Mika Špiljak, in the coordination of further work.18 A meeting was al-
ready held the next day, so the City Commission for the Investigation of Crimes 
of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators sent the City People’s Committee 200 
forms, with the note that this task would be eff ectively fulfi lled only if “ongoing 
daily contact is established between our Commission and individual regions.”19 
What these statements clearly indicate is that communication between indi-
vidual institutions was not entirely functional, which prevented comprehen-
sive and satisfactory performance of assigned tasks. However, there are also 
protests from activists, in which they characterize such expectations as unjus-
tifi ed and point out that their work is above all voluntary.20 It is apparent that 
matters did not proceed smoothly and that the planned task could not be 
 completed within a month, particularly since regular communication with the 
central offi  ce was diffi  cult, requiring urging on this issue.
In further eff orts, an assigned member was charged with touring each 
 village in which there was a local People’s Committee and contacting its mem-
bers. Th e greatest diffi  culty was “going from place to place in the fi eld. Th e fi eld 
16  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ NI, box 659, no number, 1 July 1946. See also: Zemaljska komisija 
Hrvatske za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača. Zločini u logoru Jasenovac (fo-
totipsko izdanje) / Croatian State Commission for Establishing Crimes of Occupying Forces and 
their Assistants. Crimes in the Jasenovac Camp (Banja Luka, 2000), p. XVII-XVIII.
17  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ NI, box 659, no number, 1 July 1946.
18  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 715, no. 1467/46., 9 July 1946.
19  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 715, no. 1467/46., 11 July 1946.
20  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 712, no. 1252, 9 September 1945.
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is rather extensive, and oft en the search for local People’s Committees, or 
 certain members […] takes too much time. […] [T]he eff ort and time spent 
are certainly not refl ected in the results.” As a result, it was concluded that the 
quality of work was not satisfactory in this manner and it was “impossible to 
ascertain when the list will be fi nished […].”21
A document from the Montenegrin Territorial Commission for the Inves-
tigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators testifi es to this 
same problem: “Over time, the number of offi  cials has grown to only 10 per-
sons, of whom four were typists. Th is was during the highest volume of work, 
in the second half of 1945. […] Th e success of this Commission is thus all the 
greater because materials were gathered in trackless areas and in war-torn 
Montenegrin villages.”22
Special assistance was also provided to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Commis-
sion for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators, 
which was also lagging in its work, mostly due to the enormity of the task and 
the shortage of qualifi ed staff .23
Such complaints obviously made their way up to the federal level, so the 
State Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir 
Collaborators had to be aware of these ongoing problems. However, no sig-
nifi cant progress was eff ected. Th e assistance off ered (in the sense of coordi-
nating work) was not even close to suffi  cient, so despite all eff orts, the task 
 remained incomplete, since correspondence from early 1947 still contains 
complaints over the failure to deliver the rest of the list of “victims of fascism”. 
Further, there is a demand that without “further delay you assume the task and 
urgently, within a period not to exceed 8 days, send the relevant lists, for we 
shall otherwise be compelled to notify the relevant authorities thereof.”24 Th e 
sought-aft er remaining lists were not found, so it is possible – and quite likely 
– that this task was never fully completed. However, given its enormity and the 
time involved, this task was virtually impossible from the very start.
According to the assignments specifi ed by the State Commission for the 
Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators, systematic 
crimes had to be processed and classifi ed into categories. One of them pertains 
to “reprisals” perpetrated during the time of the Independent State of Croatia 
(NDH) which were processed together.25 All cases were based on the Legal 
21  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 715, no. 1937 and 1704/46, 5 August 1946.
22  Archives of Yugoslavia (hereinaft er: AJ), Belgrade, fund 110 – State Commission for the In-
vestigation of War Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators (hereinaft er: DK), box 1-1, 
Report of Dr. Nedeljković on the work of the State Commission, p. 13.
23  AJ, fund. 110 – DK, box 1., 1-63.
24  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 718, no. 48/47., 13 January 1947.
25  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 17227-17302.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 
729, no. 547., Study on crimes - reprisals.
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Decree on protective measures due to acts of sabotage against public order and 
safety of 30 October 1943 (no. CCXXXIII – 2728 – D. V. – 1943), which, as 
oft en mentioned, was issued so that “the mass killing of our people could be 
concealed in any form”.26 Th e common motive of them all was also to retaliate 
against completed Partisan military campaigns.27 A special task was also the 
mass killings organized in Zagreb and its environs (Rakov Potok and Maksi-
mir). A particular issue was the persecution of Serbs and Jews. Additionally, 
the activities of the Mobile Courts Martial (PPS) and the Public Order and 
Safety Directorate (RAVSIGUR), later the Supreme Public Order and Safety 
Directorate (GRAVSIGUR), were examined in great detail.28
In its Instructions, it is stressed that the Commission for the Investigation 
of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators “must proceed quickly, 
moving aside all formalities and delays or postponements”.29 Additionally, 
 according to a circular from the State Commission for the Investigation of 
Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators, on the matter of crimes it 
26  Th e system of reprisals was also legalized by the Legal Decree on Procedures Pursuant to 
Communist Attacks When No Perpetrator is Found, of 2 October 1941. In such cases, this pro-
vision stipulated that the relevant agencies had to “determine and execute for each slain indi-
vidual the shooting of ten persons from among the ranks of communist leaders as determined 
by the police authorities”. Th ese provisions were adopted aft er most of the reprisals were actu-
ally carried out. Th is primarily pertained to the shooting of hostages, which became increas-
ingly frequent, beginning in July 1941. An example which may be cited is the case in which a 
group of communist youth activist attacked a parade march of Ustasha university students in 
Zagreb, for which 185 hostages, “Jews and communists”, were shot. See: Nikolina SRPAK, “Ka-
zneno pravo u doba Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (1941. – 1945.)”, Hrvatski ljetopis za pravo i 
praksu, vol. 13/2006, no. 2., p. 1129.; Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), year III., 5 and 7 August 1941. 
Th us it is obvious that these Legal Decrees had only declarative signifi cance. See: Ivo Goldstein, 
Hrvatska 1918. – 2008. (Zagreb, 2008), p. 267.-268.
27  Ljubomir Bošnjak, “Diverzije i sabotaže na području sjeverozapadne Hrvatske 1941 – 1945.”, 
Sjeverozapadna Hrvatska u NOB-u i socijalističkoj revoluciji, Ljubo Boban et al., ed. (Varaždin, 
1976), p. 194.-210.; Ivan Šibl, Iz ilegalnog Zagreba 1941. (Zagreb, 1965).
28  Th e Public Order and Safety Directorate (RAVSIGUR) was established as part of the NDH 
Internal Aff airs Ministry, functioning as a special department in that Ministry. It was conceived 
as a standard policing institution of the NDH and it was charged with supreme oversight of the 
work of all police jurisdictions and agencies. At the same time the Ustasha Supervisory Agency 
(UNS), modelled aft er the German Gestapo, was established, becoming the Ustasha regime’s 
special police. Ante Pavelić appointed Eugen Dido Kvaternik to head the RAVSIGUR and UNS, 
which consolidated the work of the entire police system. Aft er his dismissal, the UNS became 
increasingly weaker. In early 1943, the RAVSIGUR expanded its operations to include those 
under the jurisdiction of the UNS, and its name was changed to Supreme Public Order and 
Safety Directorate (GRAVSIGUR). See: Leopold Kobsa, “O organizaciji ustaškog aparata vlasti 
za provođenje terora u tzv. NDH”, Zagreb u NOB-i i socijalističkoj revoluciji (Zagreb, 1971), pp. 
241-242; Davor Kovačić, Redarstveno – obavještajni sustav Nezavisne Države Hrvatske od 1941. 
– 1945. godine (Zagreb, 2009).
29  Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske. Zbornik dokumenata 1944./III, 
p. 266.
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was necessary to cite the primary crimes, meaning intellectual initiators, those 
who gave orders and the most active perpetrators of crimes. Probably as a 
 result of this immense task and the need for the greatest possible expeditious-
ness in its completion, in almost all “major” cases, including the resolution of 
reprisal cases, a letter from the Territorial Commission for the Investigation of 
Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators of 7 November indicates that 
it will “specify Ante Pavelić as the main criminal, and the remaining actors as 
accomplices”.30 Th e same instruction was repeated on several occasions, so it 
was formulated thusly: “As to criminals, and this will be for all crimes, Ante 
Pavelić jointly with the min[ister] of internal aff airs, the director of public 
 order and safety, etc.”31 Pursuant to these notations, in all such documents, 
Ante Pavelić is almost formulaically specifi ed as the main criminal who issued 
the aforementioned Legal Decree and that he is guilty under Article 13 of the 
Court Martial Decree, as he “organized, ordered and intellectually fathered the 
mass killings”.32 Because he issued the Legal Decrees whereby, as alleged, a 
large part of the Serbs in the NDH lost their lives and property, Ante Pavelić 
was cited as the primary accountable individual. In the qualifi cation of his 
crimes, he was described as the progenitor and “organizer of systematic terror 
and plunder against the Serbian population. Th e forced expulsion of the Serbs 
and their internment. Seizure of sovereign rights. Inciting the enemy to oper-
ate and interfere in the internal aff airs of this country”.33 On the question of 
crimes committed against Jews, a circular issued by the State Commission for 
the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators very 
similarly states that specifi c emphasis should be placed on the primary crimi-
nals, meaning those who intellectually initiated, ordered and most actively 
perpetrated crimes, and there was supposed to be a brief description of the 
stance and collaboration of individual organizations which actively partici-
pated in crimes against Jews. Additionally, the “main domestic collaborators in 
the looting of Jewish property” had to be specifi cally cited.34 Th us, Ante Pavelić 
was named as the primary criminal for mass and individual forced removals, 
as he formulated the overall anti-Jewish policy, also initiated by the issuing of 
the Legal Decrees targeting Jews.35 Th e foundation for the entire legal system 
30  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 3584., 7 November 1945.
31  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 713, no. 2349, 20 November 1945.
32  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, no number; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, CGK 
no. 253/2; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, no. 15169-15182.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ 
CGK, box 723, no. 252.
33  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 485, no. 7555/46.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 734, 
CGK no. 618/88.
34  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 10, no. 2056/45, 27 July 1945.
35  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 714, no. 3232,  18 December 1945. On the accountability 
for what was perpetrated see: Ivo Goldstein, Slavko Goldstein, Holokaust u Zagrebu (Zagreb, 
2001), p. 579-595.
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was the Legal Decree on the Defence of the People and State of 17 April 1941.36 
Th e system was further supplemented by: the Legal Decree on Racial Affi  lia-
tion, the Legal Decree on Protection of the Arayan Blood and Honour of the 
Croatian Nation (30 April 1941) and the Legal Decree on the Protection of the 
People and Arayan Culture of the Croatian Nation (4 June). Th ese provisions 
were followed by an entire series of other laws, according to which Jews had to 
be registered, i.e., they had to be reported to a special station of Ustasha Secu-
rity, charged with supervision of the Jews.37 Th ey were given special insignia 
(the star of David, the letter Ž – for Židov, the Croatian word for Jew) and it 
was decreed that they could only shop in Jewish stores.38 At the beginning of 
June, the Legal Decree on Prevention of Concealment of Jewish Assets and the 
Legal Decree on Nationalization of Assets of Jews and Jewish Enterprises were 
also passed, and these were intended to establish complete control over Jewish 
assets.39 As noted in the Commission’s conclusion: “In a word, everything was 
done to eliminate Jews from all vocations and occupations and isolate them 
from the rest of society.”40
Ante Pavelić was described as the individual who bore primary accountabil-
ity for the crimes perpetrated by the GRAVSIGUR.41 Th e explanation for this 
asserted that the intellectual initiators bore the primary responsibility even 
though they did not participate in the Directorate’s specifi c operations and work. 
Particular attention in the work of the Commission for the Investigation of 
Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators was accorded to the activity of 
the Mobile Courts Martial (Pokretni prijeki sudovi – PPS). Even though the Com-
mission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collabora-
tors, as stated in the documents, oft en could not ascertain the composition of the 
PPS in individual cases42 so based on a similar analogy, the list of criminals was 
also compiled, which in this case was truly lengthy. Following the principle out-
lined in previous cases, Ante Pavelić was designated as bearing primary account-
ability, but the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and 
36  Zakoni, zakonske odredbe, naredbe NDH I (Zagreb, 1941), p. 15; Fikreta Jelić-Butić, Ustaše i 
Nezavisna Država Hrvatske 1941. – 1945. (Zagreb, 1978), pp. 159-160.
37  Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), year III, no. 88, 11 May 1941, p. 5. According to a statement by Božidar 
Cerovski this station was in Bogovićeva street no. 7, and it was headed by Ivica Baraković.
38  Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), year III, no. 113, 7 June 1941, p. 2. According to the newspaper Novi 
list of 30 May 1941, 8,860 Jews are wearing Jewish insignia.
39  Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), year III, no. 112, 6 June 1941, p. 14.; Narodne novine (Zagreb), year CV, 
no. 149, 10 October 1941, p. 2.; Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), year IV, no. 570., 1 November 1942, p. 6.
40  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 714, no. 3232, 18 December 1945. Th e German press, 
although it approved and praised these measures, added the hope that new decrees would follow 
which would settle the Jewish question.
41  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 557, no. 45227, 620/1075. Th e same decision with the same 
signature can also be found in box 741.
42  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 290, no. 16744.
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Th eir Collaborators did not name him as the primary criminal “because this is 
understood in and of itself ”.43 Th is latter aspect was somewhat expected and jus-
tifi ed, so this overall approach in determining the accountable parties was not 
overly surprising, particularly since the senior leadership of the NDH did indeed 
formulate overall policy and make decisions, so it also bore the corresponding 
accountability. However, it is noteworthy that not one case, even when individu-
al decisions were considered, included specifi c evidence against Pavelić related 
to a perpetrated act, rather it was noted that the perpetrator of a given act was 
not known, so Pavelić was mentioned as the most prominent individual due to 
his status and signifi cance. Th us, for example, one of the testimonies on mass 
crimes against the Serbs contains this statement: “I have no information on those 
Ustasha who removed him from the train station and took him to the camp. […] 
For this physical abuse of my son, which contributed to the worsening of his ill-
ness and probably led to his death, I blame Ante Pavelić as the initiator and 
person who ordered the extermination of the Serbian population, and the bodies 
and individuals subordinate to him”.44
Th ere is some question as to whether the data obtained from other territo-
rial commissions for the investigation of crimes of the occupiers and their col-
laborators were even additionally verifi ed and compared to those gathered in 
Croatia’s territory, for one of the subsequently received resolutions contains 
this statement: “Since there are many decisions against Pavelić for the grave 
crimes of mass slaughter and executions of Serbs, attach this fi le to the single 
‘decision’ for Pavelić”.45 One of the fi nal supplements to this case arrived in 
mid-April 1947, containing the order that the documents be added to the ex-
isting fi le, for in the case of certain ‘persons’ who are mentioned but who were 
not earlier processed as criminal, “there are insuffi  cient grounds for new 
decisions”.46 Pursuant to the above, it should come as no surprise that on 8 July 
1945 the news was released that the State Commission for the Investigation of 
Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators, through the Presidency of 
the Ministerial Council, sought the extradition of the war criminal Ante 
Pavelić. Among many other things, it was noted that he, as a collaborator with 
the Italians and Germans, aided the fall of the Yugoslav army and introduced a 
Quisling regime in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1941.47
43  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 290, no. 16734-16743; 16744-16749; HDA, fund 306 – 
ZKRZ Zh, box 523, no. 42227.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 729, no. 612.
44  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 280, no. 15697, 24 August 1945; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ 
CGK, box 724, no. 344., 24 August 1945.
45  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 7623/46, 27 August 1946.
46  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 486, no. 312/47, 14 April 1947.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ 
CGK, box 734,  no. 312/47, 14 April 1947.
47  “Od saveznika je zatraženo izručenje ratnog zločinca Pavelića”, Vjesnik (Zagreb), year V, no. 
68., 8 July 1945, p. 2.; “Zločinac Ante Pavelić treba da bude neodložno izručen našim vlastima“, 
Vjesnik (Zagreb), year VI, no. 311, 25 April 1946, p. 1.; “Kažnjavanje Draže Mihailovića i 
neodložno izručenje Ante Pavelića”, Vjesnik (Zagreb), year VI, no. 345, 6 June 1946, p. 4.
133
Review of Croatian History 8/2012, no. 1, 123-149
Loyalty to the Poglavnik (‘Leader’, i.e. Pavelić), was deemed particularly 
incriminating, so the list of war criminals/accomplices was generally fi lled 
with ministers in the NDH Government in charge of specifi c portfolios. How-
ever, it is important to note that since the primary criminal had already been 
determined in advance, the list of accomplices was rather broad and encom-
passed almost everyone who, by virtue of his/her status, could be included in 
any conceivable case. Among them, the name Andrija Artuković, the NDH 
internal aff airs minister, was quite oft en notable. His work was almost always 
presented as collaborative with a high degree of accountability. Th us, Artuković 
was considered responsible in cases dealing with reprisals because, as stated, 
he was responsible for issuing the aforementioned legal decrees whereby repri-
sals were performed (justifi ed).48 Th e same case applied to crimes perpetrated 
against Serbs and Jews, wherein Artuković, as minister, implemented the poli-
cies stipulated by the legal decrees based exclusively on the racial and ethnic 
principles.49 Th is principle, according to Artuković himself, implied that the 
NDH Government would “settle the Jewish question in the same way that it 
was settled by the German government”.50 In descriptions of the RAVSIGUR’s 
work, it was also asserted that Artuković was one of the persons who played 
“an active part in persecution”, i.e., he was among those who were character-
ized as “direct perpetrators in specifi c cases”.51 It is interesting that the sum-
mary report tied to the RAVSIGUR’s operations contains the conclusion that 
“it was not possible to ascertain, neither then nor now, the identity of all 
 executive organs, nor was it possible to ascertain on whose command an indi-
vidual victim was arrested, where such individual was taken to prison and his/
her fate”. Th is conclusion resulted from the fact that the Commission for the 
Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators was given “a 
relatively small number of reports […]” on this specifi c case, but this led to 
application of the already well-known system of analogies which was omni-
present in the Commission’s work.52
Pavelić appointed Eugen Dido Kvaternik the director in charge of public 
 order and safety, both in Zagreb and throughout the NDH, and he remained at 
this post until roughly the end of October 1942.53 In this regard, he was most 
48  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 729, no. 547, Study on crimes – reprisals.
49  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 15, no. 2235/30., pp. 3733-3734; F. Jelić-Butić, Ustaše i 
Nezavisna Država Hrvatske 1941. – 1945., p. 158.
50  I. Goldstein, S. Goldstein, Holokaust u Zagrebu, p. 109. Cf. Mirko Peršen, Ustaški logori (Za-
greb, 1990), p. 34.
51  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 526, no. 42382., 619/374.
52  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 523,  no. 42227., 42324.
53  Ante Pavelić dismissed him from his duties on 13 October 1942. Kvaternik remained in Za-
greb until February 1943, when he moved to Slovakia with his family. During September 1944 
he went to Austria, where he remained until May 1945, and aft erward he spent the next two 
years in Italy. In June 1947 he departed for Argentina, where he remained until his death. See: 
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oft en cited as the principal criminal in these cases, whether it was a matter of 
cases in which he personally conducted arrests and interrogations or this was 
done by subordinate agencies acting on his orders.54 According to some interpre-
tations, he was at the top of the chain of command that made decisions on kill-
ings, and he was also a member of the closest circle of people surrounding 
Pavelić.55 Since the cases of mass killings (particularly the crimes in the Maksi-
mir forest) involved numerous liquidations done over an extended period and 
that in most cases there were only vague statements as to the responsibility for 
the perpetrated crimes, most oft en Kvaternik’s accountability was specifi ed as 
unquestioned, for it was stated that as the director general of the GRAVSIGUR 
he organized mass persecution and killings.56 In this task, the Commission for 
the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators accom-
plished a great deal and “caught” the most important culprits, each of whom, by 
virtue of their posts, participated in the perpetration of these crimes. In this re-
gard, on 27 November 1945 a decision was compiled which included a proposal 
to initiate criminal prosecution against Eugen Dido Kvaternik and accomplices 
for the shootings carried out in Maksimir, and on 13 March 1946 it was  forwarded 
to the Public Prosecutor for the city of Zagreb.57 Th e name Eugen Dido Kvater-
nik, as a co-perpetrator, was also mentioned in cases involving crimes against 
Serbs. His involvement pertained to the receiving and implementation of orders, 
oft en at his own initiative. At the fi rst level of accountability, as the director gen-
eral of the Supreme Public Order and Safety Directorate, Kvaternik  “issued di-
rectives for the removal of Jews and managed these criminal activities.”58 In all 
cases, his accountability was interpreted through his role and importance in the 
GRAV SIGUR. Although his name specifi cally was rarely mentioned in reports 
or testimonies, it is certain that his accountability was immense.  However, it is 
important to note that in this case as well, his close personal relationship with 
Pavelić was underscored as exceptionally incriminating.
According to a report from a Commission envoy compiled on the basis of 
data gathered “in the fi eld”, it follows that upon perpetration of mass crimes 
“Ustasha offi  cers” fi rst came to the scene of the killing and conducted “judge-
ment and justifi cation” next to the open pits for the bodies. Th e killing meth-
ods were diverse, which was refl ected in the fi eld tours: “Scattered brain tissue, 
bones from the skull and tuft s of hair were found at the site”. Th e conclusion 
reads: “Th ese crimes were committed by Ustasha. All that could be approxi-
Marko Grčić, ed., Tko je tko u NDH. Hrvatska 1941. – 1945. (Zagreb, 1997), pp. 224-225. On 
Eugen D. Kvaternik as director see: D. Kovačić, Redarstveno – obavještajni sustav Nezavisne 
Države Hrvatske od 1941. – 1945. godine., pp. 71-88.
54  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 524, no. 42326.
55  I. Goldstein, Hrvatska 1918 – 2008., pp. 213-214, 236.
56  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 728, no.  834., CGK no. 534/42, 11 September 1945.
57  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 394/1946, 13 March 1946.
58  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 15, no. 2235/30, pp. 3733-3734.
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mately ascertained is that they were mostly Ustasha from the UNS in Zagreb. 
Furthermore, the Ustasha rail battalion […] Th e remaining Ustasha forma-
tions as perpetrators of these crimes could not be ascertained.” However, the 
principal off ender designated in this case was Mirko Puk, the minister of 
 justice and religion at the time, who, “as defender of justice should have been 
called upon fi rst and foremost to protect and safeguard the lives and other 
moral and physical goods of citizens, but instead he was the fi rst to trample on 
these things, and he was the protector of all crimes”.59 Mirko Puk, as minister, 
co-signed the aforementioned legal decrees upon which the policy against the 
Serbs is based, thereby “identifying himself with Pavelić’s policy of persecuting 
Serbs”.60 His role was similar with reference to the formulation of anti-Jewish 
policies in the NDH, so already at the end of April 1941, Justice Minister Mirko 
Puk stated that “the foundation for a law on Jews” was being prepared.61 Th is 
included Jewish-owned property, so Puk, as one of the signatories of the legal 
decree that nationalized the assets of Jews and Jewish-owned enterprises, was 
deemed the principal off ender in this regard. In the description of the crime, 
he is described as: “initiating and ordering the plunder of the assets of Jews, 
initiating and ordering mass removals to camps, a high functionary of the ter-
rorist apparatus”.62 His portfolio also included the functioning of the Extraor-
dinary Tribunals and the PPS, so in this regard, Puk, as the relevant minister, 
was also accountable as the organizer of these courts, who enforced the  enacted 
legal decrees.63
Th e names Mladen Lorković (foreign aff airs minister), Ante Nikšić and 
Mato Frković, who implemented policies as dictated by legal decrees, were 
cited along these same lines. Th is applied in particular to the case of mass 
crimes against Serbs. Lorković in particular was singled out with regard to the 
deportation of Serbs from the NDH.64 Th e plan for the mass expulsion of Serbs 
was confi rmed in an agreement between the Th ird Reich and the NDH, 
59  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 407, no. 1776/46, 31729-31768.
60  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 485, no. 7555/46.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 734, 
CGK no. 618/88.
61  Hrvatski narod (Zagreb), year III., no. 71, 24 April 1941, p. 7.
62  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 115, no. 5281/46.
63  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 290, no. 16734-16743; 16744-16749; HDA, fund 306 – 
ZKRZ Zh, box 523, no. 42227; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 729, no. 612.
64  “Nijemci su otjerali stotine hiljada Srba i Slovenaca s njihovih ognjišta. Saopćenje Državne 
komisije za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača”, Vjesnik (Zagreb), year V, no. 
209, 21 December 1945, 3. Cf. Andrija Ljubomir Lisac, “Deportacije Srba iz Hrvatske 1941.”, 
Historijski zbornik IX (1956), no. 1-4: 125-145.; Slobodan D. Milošević, Izbeglice i preseljenici na 
teritoriji okupirane Jugoslavije 1941–1945. godine (Belgrade, 1981); Ivo Goldstein, “Iseljavanje 
Srba i useljavanje Slovenaca u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj 1941. godine”, Med Srednjo Evropo 
in Sredozemljem. Vojetov zbornik, Sašo Jerše, ed., (Ljubljana, 2006), p. 595-605; Marica Karakaš 
Obradov, “Migracije srpskog stanovništva na području Nezavisne Države Hrvatske tijekom 
1941. godine”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 43 (2011), no. 3: 801-826.
136
M. GRAHEK RAVANČIĆ, Th e Work of the Land Commission for Investigation of War Crimes...
 concluded in the German embassy in Zagreb on 4 June 1941.65 Th e signed 
agreement stipulated that “a population exchange must be conducted from 4 
July and to 31 October”.66 Th e aforementioned three were also mentioned on a 
rather long list of co-participants in a case dealing with the RAVSIGUR’s ac-
tivities. In this case, all three were described as persons who “took an active 
part in the programs. Th ese are direct perpetrators in specifi c cases.”67 How-
ever, in a similar explanation for the same case, something quite diff erent is 
stated: “Th e direct perpetrators of the crimes committed in this manner can-
not be ascertained, but for all such acts committed by police organs […] he 
also bears accountability with the others as an organizer and command 
authority.”68 Nikšić was called to accountability with regard to the seizure of 
Jewish-owned assets.69 Frković was also mentioned as a co-perpetrator in cases 
of mass crimes against Serbs and in the analysis of RAVSIGUR’s activities and 
its authority.70 A letter containing the names of the persons who were ascer-
tained by the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers 
and Th eir Collaborators as participating in crimes against Serbs was forwarded 
to the Investigations Department of the Public Prosecutor in the city of Za-
greb, with the note that the complete fi les were in the archives of Commission 
for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators, “for 
the whereabouts of all commanding authorities and direct perpetrators are 
unknown, as they are in fl ight”. However, the letter states that insofar as the 
prosecution initiates criminal proceedings prior to extradition in individual 
cases (informants were particularly stressed, since it was believed that they 
would be simpler to locate than those who issued orders), it would submit the 
portions of fi les that pertained to these individuals. Placement of the docu-
ments in the archives clearly indicated that the Commission for the Investiga-
tion of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators was aware that most 
of the commanding authorities would probably never answer for their crimes.
Th e circle of the “most accountable” persons closed with these names, even 
though no specifi c breakdown existed, although the names that followed con-
65  S. D. Milošević, Izbeglice i preseljenici na teritoriji okupirane Jugoslavije 1941–1945. godine, p. 
31-32. Th e expulsion of Serbs from the territory of NDH was accompanied by the simultaneous 
expulsion of Slovenes. Th e Nazis wanted to vacate parts of Slovenian territory so that they could 
settle it with Germans. Initially the NDH authorities were not pleased with this idea, but later they 
upheld the task. See also: A. Lj. Lisac, “Deportacije Srba iz Hrvatske 1941.”, p. 126; Rafael Brčić, “O 
iseljavanju Slovenaca u Bosni 1941. godine”, Prilozi, (1973), no. 9/1: 303.; I. Goldstein, “Iseljava-
nje Srba i useljavanje Slovenaca u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj 1941. godine”, pp. 595-596.
66  S. D. Milošević, Izbeglice i preseljenici na teritoriji okupirane Jugoslavije 1941–1945. godine, p. 
31-32.
67  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 526, no. 42382, 619/374.
68  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 524, no. 42328.
69  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 115, no. 5281/46.
70  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 485, no. 7555/46; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 734, 
CGK no. 618/88; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 526, no. 42382, 619/374.
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sisted of persons from the NDH administrative apparatus who were each one 
in a series of perpetrators of individual acts characterized as war crimes. In this 
fi rst place, this pertains to Ljudevit Zimperman,71 Filip Crvenković,72 Milutin 
Jurčić73 and Erih Lisak,74 the directors general of the Supreme Public Order 
and Safety Directorate. Th ese names could be found on almost all lists of ac-
complices in cases which the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of 
the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators processed. Zimperman was thus one of 
the primary co-perpetrators in the implementation of mass crimes, particu-
larly with emphasis on crimes committed in the area of Maksimir.75 Since 
Zimperman followed Kvaternik at the top post in RAVSIGUR, it is not surpris-
ing that his name was mentioned near the top of the list of those accountable 
for crimes perpetrated by RAVSIGUR offi  cials. More precisely, the names of 
these four individuals and their role, according to the interpretation of the 
Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Col-
laborators is best described by the following citation, according to which the 
71  Ljudevit Zimperman, attorney and Ustasha offi  cial. Aft er establishment of the NDH he 
 became a departmental chief in the Ministry of Justice and Religion, and in June 1942 he was 
appointed commissioner in the Chamber of Attorneys. In mid-October of that same year he 
succeeded Kvaternik as director of the Public Order and Safety Directorate, but at the end of the 
year he was placed at the disposal of the Justice and Religion Ministry. In early 1943 he was head 
of the Offi  ce of the State Council, and as of the end of March he became a state councillor. See: 
Tko je tko u NDH, p. 431.
72  Filip Crvenković earned a law degree and a doctorate, and practiced law in Sisak. At the end 
of 1941 he became administrator of the State Monopolies Directorate in Zagreb. He succeeded 
Kvaternik as UNS commander. From December 1942 to October 1943, he served as director 
general of GRAVSIGUR. Aft er this, he was once more named chief administrator of the State 
Monopolies Directorate. In May 1945 he withdrew to Austria, and thereaft er to Argentina. See: 
Tko je tko u NDH, p. 74.
73  Milutin Jurčić earned a doctorate of laws at the Law School in Zagreb, aft er which he worked 
as an intern in Kosovo and as a judge in Samobor. From the establishment of the NDH until 
November 1942, he participated in combat as an Ustasha captain. From September 1942 to the 
end of August 1943 he was commander of the Bilogora Ustasha Command Staff  in Bjelovar. 
From October 1943 to the end of August 1944 he was director general of GRAVSIGUR, aft er 
which he was arrested as a participant in the Lorković-Vokić putsch. On the night of 10/11 Feb-
ruary 1945 he was taken from his home in Samobor, where he was killed by members of the 
Ustasha Defence. See: Tko je tko u NDH, p. 175.
74  Erih Lisak emigrated to Italy 1933, whence he returned in 1941 with Pavelić, immediately 
becoming his personal adjutant. During 1941 he held the post of public order and safety com-
missioner in the Internal Aff airs Ministry, organizing the police in individual cities. From 
 August 1942 to October 1943 he was head of the Supervisory Section in the Ustasha Army com-
mand. Aft er this he was appointed the Grand Prefect of Gora-Prigorje Grand County. From 
September to November 1944 he was appointed director general of GRAVSIGUR. Until May 
1945 he held the post of state secretary in the Internal Aff airs Ministry, and then he retreated to 
Austria. In September 1945 he stole back into Croatia, where he was arrested ten days later and 
sentenced to death. See: Tko je tko u NDH, p. 234.
75  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 295, no. 17250, CGK no. 534/59c.
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conclusion was reached that thanks to them it was “possible to maintain such 
a system, in which all of these crimes could be committed with impunity”.76 
Th e overall operations of this agency were described as the “matrix through 
which all violence was perpetrated, and it set the tone for the notorious police 
system over which it presided”.77 Th us, it comes as no surprise that the Zagreb 
Command’s Court Martial sentenced Zimperman to death on 21 July 1945.78
Filip Crvenković, also the director general of the Supreme Directorate 
( incriminating by virtue of this agency’s overall operations) attended the ses-
sion held in the Directorate’s premises in Zagreb at the request of Siegfried 
Kasche at the end of April 1943, at which it was decided that all remaining Jews 
be  arrested and interned (except those deemed the most essential, “honorary” 
or in mixed marriages),79 and “in this sense the persecution  of the remaining 
Jews commenced.” During May 1943 they had to be transferred to camps in 
Germany.80 According to one interpretation they participated in the decision 
on the fi nal “cleansing of the Jewish element”, which was being planned in har-
mony between the Germans and the NDH authorities. Th ese persons, among 
them Crvenković, were deemed among the persons most accountable for the 
fate of Zagreb’s Jews who were arrested in May 1943.81
Th e role of Milutin Jurčić, director of the Public Order and Safety Director-
ate, was particularly underscored in the processing of perpetrated reprisals. Ac-
cording to the gathered testimonies, reprisals were carried out so that the local 
police submitted a written proposal to the Supreme Public Order and Safety Di-
rectorate (GRAVSIGUR). According to testimony, the “reprisal” order was is-
sued by the director of the Supreme Public Order and Safety Directorate, who 
also determined the extent and manner in which reprisals would be conducted. 
Th is decision was made aft er the proposal and in agreement with the director of 
the Police District of the city of Zagreb and the chief of the police district’s po-
litical section and commander of the police armed forces. “Th e police district 
then sent a written proposal with the list of persons, the number of whom was 
even higher than previously ascertained”. Th is proposal was delivered to the di-
rector “who then selected persons from the list to be subjected to reprisal, and 
immediately pencilled in a brief order which read, roughly, ‘to be executed’ and 
his signature.”82 Aft er this, the political section of the Supreme Directorate would 
76  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 557, no. 45227, 620/1057.
77  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 526, no. 42382, 619/374.
78  Tko je tko u NDH, p. 431.
79  Th is agreement was not consistently observed as seen from the example: HDA, fund 306 – 
ZKRZ GUZ, box 10, no. 89.
80  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 119, no. 5281/46, CKG no. 617/489; I. Goldstein, S. Gold-
stein, Holokaust u Zagrebu, p. 470.
81  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 721, no. 3232, CGK no. 91/4.
82  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 723, no. 252.; I. Goldstein, S. Goldstein, Holokaust u Za-
grebu, p. 274.
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draw up the necessary fi les and press notices.83 Th erefore, it is clear that accord-
ing to the gathered data, Jurčić issued the order, aft er which the proposal was 
accepted and an agreement was concluded with Josip Vragović, the administra-
tor of the Police District in the city of Zagreb, and Franjo Lucić, the chief of that 
district’s political section, and Joso Rukavina, the commander of the Police 
Armed Forces. Th e aforementioned notices were drawn up by Vjekoslav Paver 
– so that “they have also been made accountable” for the perpetrated crimes.84 
Th e same level of accountability was transferred, given the function, to the case 
of mass crimes and crimes against Serbs, and in general where this pertained to 
the operation of the agency he led.
Th e case of Josip Vragović was also one of the more prominent, since 
 besides serving as director of the Police District in Zagreb, he also held a post 
in the GRAVSIGUR. In individual testimonies he was charged for “organizing 
and ordering individual mass arrests, detainments, torture and killings”.85 Th e 
minutes with Josip Vragović were compiled before a task force of the Central 
City Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir 
Collaborators in the Kanal camp (today’s Central Bus Station). In the decision 
it compiled, his last residence was registered as prison, while his “remaining 
personal data” specify that he was sentenced to death by the People’s Court.86
Erih Lisak was Pavelić’s adjutant, a grand county prefect, and the director 
of the Supreme Public Order and Safety Directorate in the NDH Internal 
 Aff airs Ministry.87 He signed decisions on reprisals, arrests, removals to camps 
and fi re squad shootings.88 His accountability on the matter of mass crimes was 
underscored in particular.89 In cases of crimes against Serbs, it was stated that 
Lisak was among the group of people who received and carried out orders, not 
infrequently at their own initiative. Besides group decisions and joint studies, 
the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir 
Collaborators also dealt with individual responsibility (which was later incor-
porated into group decisions). So there was also a decision on Lisak as the di-
83  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, no. 3847/45.
84  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, no. 11627; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 729, no. 
547, Study on crimes – reprisals.
85  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 524, no. 42327; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 722, no. 
141.
86  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 730, no. 616/2. Aft er the fall of the NDH, Josip Vragović 
was arrested on 15 May 1945, and, in 1946, sentenced to 20 years in prison, which was trans-
formed into a death sentence. Aft er an appeal, he was given 20 years in prison. He served almost 
half of his sentence in Leopoglava, Stara Gradiška and Srijemska Mitrovica. He was released 
from prison on 15 May 1954. See: Tko je tko u NDH, p. 418-419.
87  Tko je tko u NDH, p. 234.
88  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, no. 15169; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 723, no. 
252.
89  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 728, no.  834, CGK no. 534/42, 11 September 1945.
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rector of GRAVSIGUR, who was responsible for “illegal arrests, detention, 
 restriction of personal freedoms, removals to camps and killings”. In four 
 specifi c cases, persons were arrested as activists of the People’s Liberation 
Movement (Narodnooslobodilački pokret – NOP), during October and Novem-
ber 1944. Most were taken to the prison on Savska road in Zagreb and trans-
ferred to the concentration camp in Jasenovac three months later, where they 
were known to have been for a time, aft er which all trace of them was lost. Oth-
ers deemed guilty besides Lisak were Franjo Lucić, at the time he was head of 
the political section of the Police District in the city of Zagreb, Miroslav Mak, 
the chief of the sub-section for the prevention of anti-state activities in that 
same Police District, and Hinko Dominik Picilli, the administrator of the camp 
in Jasenovac. According to the attached minutes, the informants did not spec-
ify even one “accountable” name, so it is clear that even in such cases account-
ability was established, if not illogically, then nonetheless rather expectedly.90 
 Given the aforementioned, the reports in the press at the time, asserting that in 
the trials against Lisak, Ivan Šalić and others the witness testimonies exceeded 
the indictment itself, should not be surprising.91 Th e trial against Lisak and 
Šalić began on ) September 1946 before the Supreme Court of the People’s 
Republic of Croatia (NRH). On 11 October 1946, a verdict was pronounced 
“in the name of the people”. Lisak was sentenced to death by hanging, while 
Alojzije Stepinac and Ivan Šalić were sentenced to restriction of freedom for a 
duration of sixteen and nineteen years respectively, with compulsory labour 
and loss of political and civil rights for fi ve years.92
Th e next names on the lists of criminals were those who were oft en cited as 
“lower” ranking persons, i.e., those who actually carried out crimes formulated 
by the primary accountable parties, but thanks precisely to these individuals it 
was “possible to maintain such a system in which all of these crimes could be 
90  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 281, no. 15988.
91  On the trials mentioned, see also Nada Kisić-Kolanović, “Vrijeme političke represije: ‘veliki 
sudski procesi’ u Hrvatskoj 1945.-1948.”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 25 (1993), no. 1: 10-17; 
“Optužnica teško tereti izdajnike, ratne zločince i njihove pomagače na čelu s Erihom Lisakom 
i Ivanom Šalićem”, Vjesnik, (Zagreb), year VI, no. 424a., 10 September 1946, p. 1.; “Optuženi 
Gulin: ‘Ja vidim da je to usko povezano prijateljstvo, odnosno veza između ustaša i klera, između 
nadbiskupa i ustaša’”, Vjesnik, (Zagreb), year VI, no. 431, 18 September 1946, p. 1.; “Pred 
Vrhovnim sudom Narodne Republike Hrvatske započelo je suđenje grupi ustaških zlikovaca sa 
Erihom Lisakom i Ivanom Šalićem, sekretarom nadbiskupa Stepinca”, Borba (Belgrade), year XI, 
10 September 1946, p. 3.
92  “U ime naroda, Vijeće Vrhovnog suda NR Hrvatske donijelo je pravednu osudu Lisaku, 
Stepincu i družini”, Vjesnik, (Zagreb), year VI, no. 452, 12 October 1946, p. 2.; “Tekst osude 
Vijeća Vrhovnog suda NR Hrvatske. Zbog čega su osuđeni Lisak, Stepinac, Šalić i družina”, Vjes-
nik, (Zagreb), year VI, no. 453, 13 October 1946, p. 2.-3. For some documents, see: Joža Horvat 
and Zdenko Štambuk, ed., Dokumenti o protunarodnom radu i zločinima jednog dijela katoličkog 
klera (Zagreb, 1946) or Božidar Dugonjić, ed., Dokumenti o protunarodnom radu i zločinima 
jednog dijela katoličkog klera (Zagreb, 2008), pp. 357-410.
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committed with impunity”.93 Most oft en this list began with persons such as 
Božidar Cerovski,94 Viktor Tomić,95 Nikola Rajković, Stjepan Cerjak, Franjo 
Lucić, Nikola Bogojevski96 and others.97 Most of these names were associated 
with the perpetration of mass crimes during the war. Th eir personal initiative 
particularly came to the fore in the case of Cerovski, F. Lucić and Rajković, and 
it was decisive in the prosecution of crimes against the Serbs.
Th e same names were also inescapable with regard to the Jewish question, 
so Božidar Cerovski, the public order and safety commissioner in the city of 
Zagreb, who assumed “all command responsibilities” from this post, was men-
tioned as an accountable individual.98 Th e list also included the Ustasha assis-
tant commissioner for the city of Zagreb, Nikola Rajković, and Ivica Baraković, 
the chief-of-staff  of the Jewish Section in the Ustasha Police Force. Joso 
 Rukavina was also considered accountable for the deportation of Jews in Janu-
ary and August 1942, as he issued directives against the Jews. Siegfried Kasche, 
the Th ird Reich’s ambassador in Zagreb and, as alleged, a confi dant of Hitler, 
was charged, along with others, for “killings and massacres, systematic terror, 
 torture of civilians, deportation of citizens and their internment under inhu-
mane conditions” during the last removal drive, in May 1943. Kasche was also 
charged with “aligning the policies of the NDH with the policies of national 
socialism and Germany’s interests”.99 Filip Crvenković and Josip Majić were 
mentioned as the individuals who carried out these same arrests and deporta-
93  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 557, no. 45227, 620/1057.
94  Božidar Cerovski was a police offi  cer and civil servant: In April 1941 he was appointed Usta-
sha commissioner for public order and safety in Zagreb. In June he was appointed director of the 
Ustasha Police Directorate in charge of measures against “hostile elements”. In May 1945 he 
withdrew to Austria, whence the British authorities extradited him to Yugoslavia. In early 1947 
he was sentenced to death by the new authorities. See: Tko je tko u NDH, pp. 67.-68. Th e Com-
mission had data according to which Cerovski was allegedly in the English occupation zone and 
his extradition was sought through the State Commission. See: HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, 
box 715, no. 1346/46.
95  Viktor Tomić was administrator of the UNS Security Agency from the summer of 1942. 
When this agency was dissolved he transferred to the PTS Security Agency in January 1943, 
aft er which he was appointed head of the Intelligence Department of the Ustasha Army and 
promoted o the rank of Ustasha lieutenant colonel. In May 1945 he left  Croatia and spent almost 
two years in camps in Austria and Italy. When he was informed that he would be extradited to 
the Yugoslav authorities, he committed suicide. See: Tko je tko u NDH, p. 401.
96  Nikola Bogojevski was a police offi  cer. In May 1941 he joined the Ustasha movement and 
worked as an assistant in the RAVSIGUR commission at the Ustasha Headquarters in Banja 
Luka. As of early 1942 he transferred to the Protective Police in the city of Zagreb and the Pri-
gorje Grand County. At the end of 1942 he was appointed chief of the anti-communist section. 
He had a reputation as the most capable investigator. In May 1945 he withdrew to Austria, and 
later to Egypt. See: Tko je tko u NDH, pp. 43-44.
97  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 295,  no. 17250, CGK no. 534/59c.
98  I. Goldstein, S. Goldstein, Holokaust u Zagrebu, pp. 154-155.
99  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 119, no. 5281/46, CKG no. 617/488.
142
M. GRAHEK RAVANČIĆ, Th e Work of the Land Commission for Investigation of War Crimes...
tions.100 For each of these persons there were also individual indictments which 
were later incorporated into the joint case.101 Th us, Cerovski was specifi ed as 
one of the primary perpetrators of the persecution conducted by the NDH 
Public Order and Safety Directorate. Since he was a commissioner for the 
 Public Order and Safety Directorate and he led the Political Department, his 
participation in these persecutions was the “most active”. Not only did he 
 “administer the work of subordinate organs, he also personally conducted 
 arrests, personally interrogated, abused and tortured victims, held them in 
jails, sent them to camps and took them to shootings and hangings”.102 One 
testimony indicates that interrogations in Petrinjska street (in Zagreb) were 
conducted by Cerovski, and “his agents subjected me to severe physical 
abuse”.103 It was quite similar in the jail in Franje Račkog street (Zagreb), 
 although there Viktor Tomić took the lead in infl icting abuse. “Th ey beat me, 
hung me by my arms, blindfolded me and then about 10-15 of them beat me.”104 
Many statements confi rm that they genuinely distinguished themselves in this 
abuse: Nikola Rajković, the Ustasha assistant commissioner for Zagreb, and 
Viktor Tomić, who was described in a number of instances as one of the most 
brutal Ustasha police offi  cers.105
An agent particularly noted in the jail on Square “N” (Zagreb) was Franjo 
Lucić, who interrogated and abused arrested persons.106 Krešimir Fibić deliv-
ered his testimony before the Central City Commission for the Investigation of 
Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators and in it he imputed Franjo 
Lucić, an offi  cial with the police force in Đorđićeva street. Namely, on the night 
of 16/17 October 1944, “Ustasha police agents” burst into his home due to 
 reports that he illegally possessed a radio receiver which he was using to send 
news to London and Moscow. Th e radio was taken from him, and the accused 
100  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 721, no. 3232, CGK no. 91/4.
101  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 119, no.  5281/46, CKG no. 617/494; HDA, fund 306 – 
ZKRZ GUZ, box 119, no. 5281/46, CKG no. 617/495; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 119, 
no. 5281/46, CKG no. 617/496.
102  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 524, no. 42324, 42330.
103  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 524, no. 42324, 616/134; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 
725, no. 395.
104  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 524, no. 42324, 616/147; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 
557 no. 45240, 620/1088.; One of the testimonies is also available in: Lutvo Ahmetović et al., ed., 
Zbornik sjećanja Zagreb 1941 – 1945., vol. 2, (Zagreb, 1983), pp. 218-219.
105  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 730, no. 616/2; I. Goldstein, S. Goldstein, Holokaust u 
Zagrebu, p. 551. According to Jere Jareb’s interpretation, Vjekoslav Luburić and Viktor Tomić 
carried out the orders which they received directly from Ante Pavelić. See: Jere Jareb, ed., Eugen 
D. Kvaternik, Sjećanja i zapažanja 1925 – 1945 (Zagreb, 1995), p. 284. On his biography, see: Tko 
je tko u NDH, p. 401.
106  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 526, no. 42382, 619/80; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 
526, no. 42382, 619/374.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 581, no. 45227, 620/301, 620/357.
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was sent to the police for questioning, where his case was handled by Lucić.107 
Given the numerous statements, it comes as no surprise that the Public Pros-
ecutor was given a proposal for criminal charges against Franjo Lucić and an 
order to place his assets under temporary management and supervision.108
In the majority of cases, offi  cers of the Police Force who conducted arrests 
and interrogations were mentioned as co-participants. Th us, for example, the 
arrests were conducted by: “Miroslav Mak and Marko Prpić, offi  cers, who 
made the decision to hang the victim as a form of reprisal”.109 In the other re-
ports, Ivan Čeko, Zvonimir Draženović, Vilim Dugi, Tomo Filipović, Stipe 
Radić, Danijel Rogić, Ante Skelin and Franjo Sučić were indicated as co-par-
ticipants in this crime as the police agents who most oft en participated in the 
arrests of individuals and in the statements of survivors their names were the 
only ones noted as guilty parties.
Allegedly not even Zvonimir Draženović was left  behind. As commander of 
the Police Force and later chief of the political section, he administered opera-
tions but also personally conducted arrests and abuse.110 Đorđe Radovanović 
delivered testimony on the matter of Zvonimir Draženović. In it, he said he was 
taken to the Armed Forces Police in Zvonimirova street, where he was handed 
over to Draženović, who then abused him. From there he was transferred to 
Savska street, where he was also abused for over six weeks. In this testimony, he 
said Draženović “using all possible terrorist means to physically and mentally 
torture me” until he forced him to admit that he intended to fl ee to the Parti-
sans, “even though he found no real evidence for this”.111 His fi nal destination 
was Đorđićeva street, where he awaited amnesty on 23 December 1944.112 Ac-
cording to the testimony of Pavao Kralj, he was in jail from 30 July 1944 to 7 
May 1945. During his stay there were beatings, suff ocation, hangings on a pole, 
confi nement in a bunker for seven days, starvation, tearing out of hair and nails, 
to which an attached physician’s report testifi ed.113 Th at Draženović issued 
 orders for arrests was also confi rmed by the case of Ivan Slade, who was fi rst 
held in Zvonimirova street no. 9, and then transferred to Savska road, where he 
remained for fi ve months. He had to be hospitalized due to torture, and aft er 
107  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 228., Zh 9565. Cf. HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK Zagreb, 
box 711, no. 177/45.
108  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ NI, box 650, 611/P.
109  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 276, no. 15169-15182.
110  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 525, no. 42337.; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 97, no. 
4289/46; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 245, no. 11579, 11605; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, 
box 276, no. 15160; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 291, no. 16843; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ 
Zh, box 557, no. 45239, 620/1087.
111  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 197, no. 6229.
112  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK Zagreb, box 721, no 24.
113  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 184, no. 5059a.
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this he was transferred to the jail in Nova Ves, where he was sentenced to two 
years in jail the Court Martial of the Zagreb City Command. He was moved to 
Lepoglava, and from there, prior to the arrival of the Yugoslav Army, he was 
transferred to Jasenovac, where all trace of him was lost.114 One of the cases in 
which Draženović was cited as the primary culprit pertained to the victims 
 Antun Berc, the Senjarić brothers and Slavko and Draga Jeršić, who were 
 arrested in early November 1944 and taken to Savska road, where they were 
interrogated for fi ve days in the presence of Ante Skelin and Ivan Toth. At the 
end of the year, Drago Jeršić and Antun Berc were taken to Stara Bistra, where 
they were hung, while the Senjarić brothers were hung in Odra as a form of 
 reprisal in January 1945.115 Th erefore, it was to be expected that soon aft er the 
formation of the Department in charge of “enemy assets” the property of Zvo-
nimir Draženović was among the seven completed cases (which also included 
major enterprises).116 In this vein, his entire assets were placed under the  interim 
management of the Territorial People’s Assets Administration and an interim 
administer for it was appointed.117 A high number of decisions compiled on war 
crimes perpetrated by Draženović prompted a request for his extradition to the 
Allied countries, since the Commission had at its disposal data according to 
which Draženović was in the Fermo camp in Italy.118
Danijel Rogić, a referral offi  cer for the Police District in the city of Zagreb, 
was also mentioned in several testimonies.119 In the case of Ivan Filipčić, he con-
ducted interrogations in Petrinjska street, wherein the prisoner was hung on a 
pole between two chairs with hands and legs bound. Th e fi le also contains a deci-
sion of the State Security Administration (Uprava državne bezbednosti – UDBa) 
which defi nes Rogić as a war criminal.120 Numerous testimonies noted that Rogić 
was in the jail in Savska road. In its letter to the District Commission for the In-
vestigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators, the Central City 
Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Col-
laborators stated that he was “sentenced to death by the People’s Government”.121 
Arrests were mostly conducted on the basis of various denunciations, and their 
perpetrators were frequently identifi ed by name, and while the agents conduct-
114  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 242, no. 11269; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 723, no. 
247.
115  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 184, no. 5032; Z. Draženović is also specifi ed as the pri-
mary culprit in: HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 725, no. 375.
116  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 720, no. 48/45, 23 June 1945.
117  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ NI, box 649, no. 318/P.
118  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 242, Criminals in fl ight abroad. 
119  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 216, no. 8018-8019; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 226, 
no. 9416; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 228, no. 9679-9680; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 
525, no. 42338.
120  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 217, no. 8313/95.
121  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 715, no. 1451/46.
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ing interrogations were largely named as the accountable persons, although this 
information was cited provisionally or taken from secondary sources.122 A por-
tion of testimonies, as already stated, confi rmed that physical abuse was frequent 
during interrogations. A part of the information was gathered during visits when 
families came to take possession of the bloody clothing of prisoners.123 However, 
this was normally followed by: “Who beat her, I don’t know. I’m old and illiterate 
so I don’t know any details”.124 Most oft en they stated that the arrests, trials and 
shootings involved participation by “a certain” someone, e.g. Sabljak, Skelin, 
Bracanović, etc. who were agents in Ustasha jails and who truly participated in 
arrests and abuse, to which the high number of statements testifi es. However, 
more detailed accompanying information was lacking, so generally the follow-
ing was mentioned: “I have no greater details on these crimes, nor do I know of 
any greater details on the manner of their perpetration.”125 Despite this, at this 
level it was not diffi  cult to compile decisions on war crimes, particularly because 
the names of the persons employed at the Police Force very oft en appeared as the 
culpable parties in various cases. Th e guilt of its staff  members intertwined with 
cases of reprisals, mass persecution, mobile extraordinary courts, courts martial, 
etc. Th eir accountability was generally described with the comprehensive quali-
fi cation: “mass killing, persecution and abuse”.126 All of these persons who were 
specifi ed as culprits/co-culprits for the perpetrated crimes truly were, each with-
in in his own framework, participated in perpetration of these crimes. What is 
diffi  cult to ascertain is the extent to which they incited these crimes, and the 
extent to which they were mere performers of individual activities, particularly 
if one takes into consideration that the criminal systems oft en made innocent 
persons guilty.
Th e analyzed cases provide a picture of all levels of collaboration (categor-
ical structure) and perpetration of war crimes (particularly their forms), both 
through individual and through group decisions. Th e fi rst category would en-
compass the chief collaborators, the organizers, ideologues and order-issuing 
authorities for the perpetration of crimes. Th e next group would consist of 
those who implemented these orders and the persons who implemented poli-
cies to benefi t the occupying powers, while the third group would consist of 
members of military formations, staff  in institutions, and others who partici-
pated in shootings, hangings and any other form of reprisal. Th e range was 
122  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 17226a-17302. “Maksimir” crimes – evidentiary 
material, CGK no. 534/21.
123  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 17226a-17302. “Maksimir” crimes – evidentiary 
material, no. 24/45.
124  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 17226a-17302. “Maksimir” crimes – evidentiary 
material, no. 289/45, CGK no. 534/25.
125  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no. 17226a-17302. “Maksimir” crimes – evidentiary 
material, CGK no. 534/36.
126  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 291, no. 16827.
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truly broad and covered: the integrated occupation apparatus, destruction of 
the people’s liberation movement, the struggle against Partisan units, crimes 
against civilians, looting of assets and violence of all type. However, all of them, 
as oft en stated, shared the common interest of the occupiers, which deter-
mined and assigned each individual role and task.
Looking at the overall picture, it is important to note that in most cases, the 
list of co-perpetrators, given that the primary criminal was – as already noted 
– determined in advance – was quite broad and included almost every person 
who may have been involved in a given case by virtue of his status. Even though 
the culpability of most of them was not in question, in most cases the question 
of their specifi c and individual accountability was not clearly delineated, rather 
the principle was stressed that their accountability was implied in and of itself. 
Th is is also partially confi rmed by the letter from the Central City Commis-
sion for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators 
sent to the Territorial Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the 
 Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators which sent general instructions due to their 
return of 16 cases (dealing with perpetrated reprisals) which had to be “supple-
mented” according to the newest instructions. At the city level, criticism was 
levelled at this case “because here it is case of entirely diff erent crimes, perpe-
trated over several years at diff erent locations and, most importantly, under 
diff erent crimes”. Additionally, it was stated that such a task would be diffi  cult 
to complete from the technical aspect as well, for the broadness of the case 
meant it would be incomplete and diffi  cult to review.127 However, as concluded, 
this was only an opinion, while decisions were made at other levels. Th is criti-
cism was not accepted, because on 20 November a response was forwarded to 
the Central Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and 
Th eir Collaborators which reinforced the position that all reprisals be treated 
as a single case, which was, as stated, also the “stance of the State Commission”.128 
In this vein, a fi nal report on reprisals was compiled, citing numerous  common 
elements in their perpetration.129 Th is report concludes with this statement: “It 
is certain and unambiguous that many other criminals participated in this 
massacre, but even though this commission could not ascertain anything about 
them, they will have to be detected and justly tried”.130 Th is type of crime may 
be one of the most detailed to be researched by the Commission for the Inves-
tigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators. An extenuating 
circumstance was the notices on perpetrated reprisals published in the NDH 
press. Th is was a sound foundation upon which further cases could be built, 
but most of them were missing statements from any manner of witness, so 
127  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 713, no. 2159, 12 November 1945. Th e same document 
is available in box 296 under the same call number.
128  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 296, no 3584, 20 November 1945.
129  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 729, no. 547, Study on crimes – reprisals.
130  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 729, no. 547, Study on crimes – reprisals.
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there were not even more detailed data on what was done. Th erefore, it was 
convenient to ascribe accountability to those who held the highest posts in the 
system and occasionally expand the list with the names of individuals who 
conducted interrogations in a fl agrantly brutal manner in the various jails in 
Zagreb at the time.
According to the conclusion concerning the operations of RAVSIGUR/
GRAVSIGUR, “it was not possible to establish, neither then nor now, the iden-
tity of all executive organs, nor was it possible to ascertain the orders under 
which individual victims were arrested, where they were taken to detention 
and what their fate was”. Th is conclusion was a consequence of the fact that 
“the commission was given a relatively small number of reports […]”.131 
 According to the available records, from March 1943 to May 1945, a total of 
1,170 victims were processed, who were recorded in 1,074 reports.132 Compu-
tation of the total damages incurred due to this crimes remained equally unde-
fi ned, for only some reports contain damage claims. Th is is backed by reports 
which, not knowing specifi c culprits for a given crime, accused: “We deem the 
Ustasha poglavnik and unidentifi ed Ustasha from the Petrinjska police [the 
police in Zagreb’s Petrinjska street] guilty of this crime”.133 In order to secure a 
more complete picture, it is important to emphasize that this case was one of 
the more extensive, but given the extensive tasks, even here the Commission 
for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators was 
not entirely satisfi ed with the fi nal result. Even though one may gain the 
 impression that the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occu-
piers and Th eir Collaborators did not entirely complete any task, such a 
 conclusion would not be absolutely warranted. Given the as-yet methodologi-
cally unknown operating formula and the fact that the set tasks were truly 
 all-encompassing, while the deadlines were rather short (which does not mean 
that there was no time), a considerable amount was accomplished. Another 
interesting matter is the Department in charge of “enemy assets”, which was 
charged with compiling an overall view of the property transfers in the land 
registers during the “occupation”, but with time it became clear that such a task 
would be diffi  cult to implement, so a decision was made subsequently to set it 
aside, while the proposal for an asset sequester was only sent in those cases 
when individuals owned specifi c property if it had greater value. Th is was 
 particularly so because it quickly became apparent that seizure of assets of an 
increasing number of people would be burdensome to the state, so eff orts were 
dedicated to the more “feasible” cases.
In assessing its overall work, I cannot overlook the evident shortcomings 
in this service, which fi rst and foremost pertained to its considerable lack of 
131  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 523,  no. 42227, 42324.
132  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ GUZ, box 97, no. 2396/46; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ CGK, box 741 
no. 620/1075; HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 583, no. 45227-45560.
133  HDA, fund 306 – ZKRZ Zh, box 523, no. 42324., 616/14.
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objectivity, frequent use of ideologically tainted terminology, bias and unsys-
tematic approach, which are clearly indicated by the available documents. Th e 
gathered evidence (reports), of which a considerable portion is rather vague in 
matters of locations and times of crimes, as well a the accountability for these 
acts, may only serve as testimony on crimes perpetrated during the war aft er 
considerable comparison with other documentation (which I believe was not 
greatly practiced in the work of the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes 
of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators), but they are not the most accurate 
indicators of accountability. Additionally, the principle underlying the work 
was not individual, i.e., the approach for establishing the accountable parties 
oft en took the form of “collective responsibility”. Moreover, at the state level 
non-uniform criteria for the establishment of guilt was noted. Individuals were 
treated diff erently for the same behaviour by diff erent territorial commissions. 
“Th e drastic diff erence between Territorial Commissions appeared when deal-
ing with civilians serving or acting as associates to the occupiers and Quislings. 
Further research will show that there was a territorialization of criteria, that 
political subjectivity was introduced and that there was a non-uniform appli-
cation of criteria in the work of the territorial commissions when they pro-
claimed individuals perpetrators of war crimes”.134 Nonetheless, from the over-
all standpoint, Dušan Nedeljković, the chairman of the State Commission for 
the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators, noted in 
his fi nal report without any particular euphoria that the ultimate result of the 
work was “immense and satisfactory”.135 According to many statements made 
by the actual staff  in the in his fi nal report, the research apparatus was excep-
tionally faulty, so that this shortcoming had to be rectifi ed by legal experts who 
did the bulk of the work. If the research teams did not do their job well, the ques-
tion arises as to the manner in which they gathered the research material that 
served as the foundation for determining accountability for any possible perpe-
trated crimes. However, this question was not within the realm of the work done 
by the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir 
Collaborators, rather it was a matter for the courts, which had to launch or halt 
further proceedings pursuant to the proposal of the Commission for the Investi-
gation of Crimes of the Occupiers and Th eir Collaborators. However, it is worth 
noting that it was stressed on several occasions that the work should not be 
“shackled by legal norms”. Th e justice of the time, as extolled by the Yugoslav 
Army Generals Koča Popović and Peko Dapčević upon their entry into Bel-
grade, “also includes retribution”.136 And it truly was present.
134  Miodrag Đ. Zečević and Jovan P. Popović, ed., Dokumenti iz istorije  Jugoslavije, vol. I (Bel-
grade, 1996), p. 14.
135  AJ, fund. 110 – DK, box 1, 1-74.
136  Ivan Janković, Smrt u prisustvu vlasti. Smrtna kazna u Jugoslaviji i svetu (Belgrade, 1985), p. 
174. 
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Die Tätigkeit der Landeskommission für die Feststellung der von 
Okkupanten und ihren Helfern begangenen Verbrechen: Analyse 
nach den gesetzten Zeilen und Fällen
Zusammenfassung
Mittels dargestellter Fälle, für die von der Landeskommission für die Fest-
stellung der von Okkupanten und ihren Helfern begangenen Verbrechen die 
Verantwortung festgestellt wurde, versucht man in dieser Arbeit alle Ebenen 
von Kollaboration und Verübung von Kriegsverbrechen (besonders ihre For-
men) darzustellen. Die Forschung basiert sowohl auf  den auf Einzelne, als 
auch auf Gruppen bezogenen Urteilen der genannten Kommission. Spannwei-
te dieser Verbrechen war sehr breit und umfasste Verbrechen gegen integrati-
ves Okkupationsapparat, Vernichtung der Volksbefreiungsbewegung, Kampf 
gegen Partisaneneinheiten, Verbrechen gegen Bürger, Plünderung des Eigen-
tums und Gewaltakte jeder Art.
